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to member chains; and, because of geographical separation, the mem-
bers are not natural competitors. But even if some direct competition
should arise as a result of the expansion of some of the members, there
remains a competitive advantage, albeit shared, over the nonmember
chains operating in the area of overlap. Also, since the reason for the
formation of the association was to provide the member retail chains
with private labels so that they might better compete with the larger
chains, it would seem that wholesaling should amount to a relatively
insignificant part of the members' sales.
The significance of Topco is that it reaffirms the Court's commit-
ment to per se rules of the illegality of certain agreements and practices
under the Sherman Act and establishes to a certainty that horizontal
territorial restraints and customer restrictions are per se illegal even
when not accompanied by price fixing." It appears that the Court has
followed a more or less straight course in arriving at the Topco decision.
When faced with this pure case of horizontal territorial restraints and
customer restrictions, the Court did just what it had indicated it would
do. Now, with Topco placed beside Schwinn, it seems clear that division
of territories among competitors or restrictions upon the customers to
whom they may sell are per se violations of the Sherman Act whether
the arrangement is brought about horizontally or vertically.
D. STEVE ROBBINS
Constitutional Law: Conventional Reluctance or Doctrinal Departure?
The Political Question Doctrine.
Shortly before the 1972 Democratic National Convention, the Su-
preme Court was asked to consider a suit, O'Brien v. Brown,' filed by
California delegates who had been excluded from the Convention by a
ruling of the Democratic Credentials Committee.' The Court, uncom-
fortably confined by lack of time, issued a brief opinion which both
delayed action on the petition for certiorari and stayed the Court of
"See generally Case Comment, Horizontal Territorial Restraints and the Per Se Rule, 28
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 457 (1971).
'92 S. Ct. 2718 (1972) (per curiam). The petition for certiorari was filed on July 6, 1972 and
the full convention began July 10th.
2The 1972 Credentials Committee had issued its decision on June 29, 1972. Brown v. O'Brien,
No. 72-1628, at 4 (D.C. Cir. July 5, 1972).
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Appeals' intervening judicial hand. Thus the Convention was left to its
own devices.
In its opinion the Court chose to stress "grave doubts" about the
judiciary's power to review such matters, saying that "[h]ighly impor-
tant questions are presented concerning justiciability, . . . state action,
and . . . the reach of the Due Process clause." 3 In light of the vigorous
expansion of the justiciability4 and state action5 doctrines in the past
decade, particularly in voting rights cases,' one might have assumed
those considerations would pose no barrier. Until the Court subse-
quently develops and clarifies its doubts, however, the applicability of
the doctrines to national political party affairs, and perhaps to a range
of other cases, is shrouded in uncertainty.
7
'92 S. Ct. at 2719.
'See Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE
L.J. 517 (1966); Tollett, Political Questions and the Law, 42 U. DEr. L.J. 439 (1965); Note,
Constitutional Safeguards in the Selection of Delegates to Presidential Nominating Conventions,
78 YALE L.J. 1228 (1969). For earlier but still valuable opinion see generally Field, The Doctrine
of Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 MINN. L. REV. 485 (1924); Finkelstein, Judicial
Self-Linitation, 37 HARV. L. REV. 338 (1924).
5See Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, Foreword: "'State Action." Equal Protection,
and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69 (1967); Chambers & Rotunda, Reform of
Presidential Nominating Conventions, 56 VA. L. REv. 179, 194 (1970); Comment, Constitutional
Reform of State Delegate Selection to National Political Party Conventions, 64 Nw. J.L. REV.
915, 918 (1970); Note, The Presidential Nomination: Equal Protection at the Grass Roots, 42 S.
CAL. L. REV. 169 (1968).
'Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964);
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186 (1962); see Bode v. National Democratic Party, 452 F.2d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 197 1), cert.
denied. 92 S. Ct. 684 (1972); Georgia v. National Democratic Party, 447 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir.)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971); cf Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969); Williams
v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
'This note will not deal with state action and the reach of the due process clause, though some
of the cases examined bear on those issues. Regarding state action we may observe briefly that
though no state or national laws impinged directly on the convention itself, all delegates were
selected subject to state laws. Further, in view of the white primary cases, the delegate selection
procedures, if not the entire convention, should be subject to scrutiny at least where allegations of
constitutional impropriety relate directly to the selection of a presidential candidate. Similar
arguments have been heard with favor by the courts in cases cited note 73 infra.
The alleged due process violation in O'Brien, moreover, was a fundamental one-that rules
of delegate selection were altered after the selection process was completed. The authority of the
various Democratic bodies who first approved California's procedures and then disapproved them
may be difficult to ascertain, but the product of their disagreement was a violation of the expecta-
tions of all who cast ballots in California. A holding that the due process clause could not reach
this ex post facto reversal of voting procedures, if justiciability and state action were found, would
be unjustified.
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THE DECISION IN O'BRIEN V. BROWN
After a plurality victory in the California presidential primary,8
Senator George McGovern seemed to have captured all 271 delegates
to the National Convention.' Subsequently, however, challengers sought
a partial ouster of his delegates, insisting that California's "winner-take-
all" primary procedure violated the mandate for a "full, meaningful and
timely opportunity to participate" in delegate selection 0 which had been
adopted by the 1968 Democratic Convention." When the Credentials
3N.Y. Times, June 7, 1972, at 1, col. 8.
'See CAL. ELECTIONS CODE §§ 6300-98 (West Supp. 1972), especially § 6386. The California
State Democratic Party had been assured by National Party Chairman Lawrence O'Brien in a
February 1, 1972, letter that the state laws were in "full compliance" with Democratic guidelines.
B. Marshall, Hearing Officer, In the Matter of the Challenges to the California Delegation to the
1972 Democratic National Convention: Findings, June 27, 1972, at 3 [hereinafter cited as Hearing].
'"It is understood that a State Democratic Party in selecting and certifying delega-
tions to the National Convention thereby undertakes to assure that such delegates have
been selected through a process in which all Democratic voters have had a full and timely
opportunity to participate.
In determining whether a state party has complied with this mandate, the conven-
tion shall require that:
(I) The unit rule not be used in any stage of the delegate selection process; and
(2) All feasible efforts have been made to assure that delegates are selected through
party primary, convention, or committee procedures open to public participation within
the calendar year of the National Convention.
Transcript of Proceedings: The 35th Quadrennial Convention of the Democratic National Conven-
tion, Aug. 26-29, 1968, at 269 [transcript errors corrected], quoted in Segal, Delegate Selection
Standards: The Democratic Party's Experience, 38 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 873, 879 (1970).
"Except for loyalty and anti-discrimination requirements, the Democrats operated until 1968
largely without imposing rules of delegate selection on state organizations. Segal, supra note 10,
at 876-77. At the 1968 Convention, however, the Party adopted its mandate and authorized a
commission to "aid State Democratic Parties in fully meeting the responsibilities and assurances
thus required", Id. at 878; this gave the national apparatus greatly expanded powers of scrutiny
over state selection processes. See generally Schmidt & Whalen, Credentials Contests at the
1968-and 1972-Democratic National Conventions, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1438 (1969). The commis-
sion, under the chairmanship of Senator George McGovern, decided that guidelines were necessary
to enforce the mandate. Guidelines were therefore developed and promulgated to state parties, and
it was on the basis of such guidelines that the California challengers first disputed the primary
results. When a hearing officer appointed by the Credentials Committee found that the winner-
take-all arrangement did not violate the guidelines, Hearing 7-8, the challengers switched to the
argument that the primary had violated the 1968 mandate itself. Brown v. O'Brien, No. 72-1628,
at 8-9 (D.C. Cir. July 5, 1972).
The California delegates argued that the 1968 mandate did not require abolition of winner-
take-all primaries; indeed, they argued that the 'legislative history' of the mandate led to the
contrary conclusion. Id. at 9. The delegates said further that the acceptance of the guidelines by
all the candidates, and by national and state party officials, as well as explicit national party
approval of California's arrangement, Hearing 3, prevented the Credentials Committee from
altering or re-interpreting the rules after the election.
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Committee sustained this challenge and unseated 151 of McGovern's
delegates, 2 the ousted Californians sought judicial relief, alleging that
the Credentials Committee and the national party had violated their
fourteenth amendment rights to due process1 3 and equal protection of
the laws. 4 (They were joined by ousted delegates from Illinois, who had
sued separately but whose case was decided jointly by the courts. 5)
The complaint was dismissed by the district court. 6 The court of
appeals then affirmed the dismissal of the Illinois complaint but re-
versed the dismissal of the California complaint, remanding to the
district court with instructions to declare the Credentials Committee
ruling null and void and to enjoin the Party from excluding the McGov-
ern delegates. 7 Justiciability was not even addressed by the appellate
court. Nor did the court of appeals' opinion appear to have difficulty
in finding requisite state action 8 on the authority of Terry v. Adams 9
and Georgia v. Natinal Democratic Party."0 Instead, the court examined
the force of 1968 mandate and the McGovern guidelines 2' and held that
the Credentials Committee had violated due process of law by defying
these guidelines.
22
The California challengers and the Democratic Party immediately
'2The intraparty authority as to the McGovern Guidelines is somewhat unclear. The National
Democratic Committee had adopted the guidelines at a February, 1971 meeting. Brown v. O'Brien,
No. 72-1628, at 6 (D.C. Cir. July 5, 1972). It was they who had assured the state party that the
winner-take-all primary was in full compliance. Yet Eli Segal, who had served as counsel for the
McGovern Commission, wrote in 1970 that the National Committee had no right to approve the
guidelines after their development. "In essence," he wrote, "the National Convention should be
viewed as a self-contained legal system. . .. [tihe legality of the [mandate] and the Commission's
efforts to implement it are subject to judicial review by the 1972 Credentials Committee and the
Convention itself." Segal, supra note 10, at 883 n.58.
3Brown v. O'Brien, No. 72-1628, at 5-6 (D.C. Cir. July 5, 1972).
"Plaintiffs asserted that delegates from twelve states were selected pursuant to some variant
of the winner-take-all principle. Id. at 12 n.4.
"5Fifty-nine Illinois delegates were excluded when challengers alleged violation of several
guidelines involving open and fair processes for delegate selection. The challengers' allegations
were supported by a hearing officer and affirmed by the full Committee. In their suit, the ousted
Illinois delegates urged that each of the guidelines as applied to them was unconstitutional, either
abridging their rights as delegates under Illinois law or, insofar as they imposed quotas, violating
their rights under the equal protection clause. Id. at 12-22. Though the case was considered jointly
with the California challenge, this note will not discuss the issues it raised.
"192 S. Ct. at 2719.
"Brown v. O'Brien, No. 72-1628 (D.C. Cir. July 5, 1972).
lid. at 6.
19345 U.S. 461 (1953).
-477 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971).
"The guidelines are discussed in notes 11-12 supra.
"No. 72-1628, at 10-12.
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petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, asking for an
expedited hearing and a temporary stay of the court of appeals' order.
The Court convened but did not hear the parties or ask for briefs.
Instead they granted a stay of the appellate decision until a subsequent
date. The effect was to "unseat" the elected McGovern delegates. The
Court's per curiam decision expressed reluctance to permit judicial in-
terference in the "internal determinations of a national political
party. ' 23 The Court asserted that such action would be unprecedented,
distinguishing Terry v. Adams and Smith v. Allwright 4 as cases "in
which claims are made that injury arises from invidious discrimination
based on race in a primary contest within a single State."2 Noting that
the Convention itself was a "forum" for possible redress, the Court gave
the Democrats responsibility for untangling the combatants and settling
the fight.
26
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Douglas, registered a strong
dissent .2 He quarreled with the intimation that the issue was nonjustici-
able as a political question, recalling that "[h]alf a century ago, Justice
Holmes . . . made it clear that a question is not 'political' in the juris-
dictional sense, merely because it involves the operations of a political
party . .. 28 Marshall argued that the separation-of-powers considera-
tions which underlay the doctrine were inapplicable to political parties;
that judicially manageable standards, mandated by Baker v. Carr,20
were clearly available to judge the merits of the claim; and that the
involvement of the state at all levels of the primary and general election
for President provided the necessary state action.30
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
According to Powell v. McCormack,1 justiciability resolves itself
into two considerations: "whether the claim presented and the relief
sought are of the type which admit of judicial resolution [and] whether
2192 S. Ct. at 2720.
-321 U.S. 649 (1944).
2192 S. Ct. at 2720 n.l.
2 'The full Convention subsequently reversed the decision of the Credentials Committee for
reasons not altogether judicial or deliberate. N.Y. Times, July I1, 1972, at I, col. 8.
292 S. Ct. at 2721.
"Id. at 2723. Justice Marshall was referring to Justice Holmes' remarks in Nixon v. Herndon,
273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927).
-369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
1092 S. Ct. at 2724.
31395 U.S. 486 (1969).
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the structure of the Federal Government renders the issue presented a
'political question'. .. . It is not surprising that the political ques-
tion doctrine has been the subject of much disagreement, for it is closely
tied to fundamental constitutional debates on the justification and pur-
pose of judicial review in a democratic society. 3 The Supreme Court
has favored a separation-of-powers interpretation of the doctrine in
recent cases.34 In fact, it has departed from that interpretation only in
the direction of greater judicial intervention.
A leading case interpreting the political question doctrine is Baker
v. Carr.35 The appellants in Baker sued complaining that the Tennessee
legislature, contrary to its own constitution," had not reapportioned
itself at regular intervals to reflect population changes .3  Alleging that
they were without other means of relief, appellants claimed they had
been denied equal protection of the laws under the fourteenth amend-
ment.38 A three-judge district court invoked procedural grounds, in-
cluding nonjusticiability, to forego a decision on the merits.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court, partly
because of its misinterpretation of justiciability. It was not a case's
political flavor which brought it within the doctrine, but whether the
"Id. at 516-17.
"Those who follow Chief Justice Marshall's reasoning in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I
Cranch) 137 (1803), that judicial review is a duty imposed by the Constitution tend to see justicia-
bility as a question of the separation of powers. Thus Professor Wechsler insisted in his grand
defense of this "classical" tradition," [A]II the doctrine can defensibly imply is that the courts are
called upon to judge whether the Constitution has committed to another agency of government
the autonomous determination of the issue raised, a finding that itself requires an interpretation."
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1959).
This view has been strongly attacked for the rigidity of its insistence on the necessity ofjudicial
intervention. Learned Hand argued that courts had the positive duty to intervene only where there
was a particular reason to do so, even when another agency had exceeded its constitutional author-
ity. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1-30 (1958). In this analysis, the political question doctrine
became proof of the court's discretion to intervene or remain apart. Alexander Bickel's influential
theory of the role of the judiciary similarly assigned justiciability a place among devices to post-
pone, on procedural grounds, certain difficult questions which the Court judged might strain its
social legitimacy to decide. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term, Foreword: The Passive Virtues,
75 HARV. L. REv. 40 (1961). For a more complete discussion of the underpinnings of the political
question doctrine, see Scharpf, supra note 4.
31See generally note 6 supra.
-369 U.S. 186 (1962).
'Uld. at 188-89.
1Jd. at 191.
3The logic was that insofar as a representative from an urban area might represent thousands
more voters than one from a rural area, the voting power of the urban dweller was debased relative
to that of the rural voter.
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configuration of circumstances made it a threat to separation of pow-
ers.39 In an extensive review of cases, the majority carefully demon-
strated that no litmus paper test sufficed to explain justiciability deci-
sions. "[S]weeping statements to the effect that all questions touching
foreign relations are political questions"4 as with generalizations about
other ostensibly proscribed judicial areas, were simply inaccurate.
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political ques-
tion is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossi-
bility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's un-
dertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the re-
spect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherance to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.
4
1
Despite the highly charged political issue of the apportionment of politi-
cal power between urban and rural residents in Tennessee, the majority
in Baker saw nothing to deter the district court from reaching a decision
on the merits. The Tennessee legislature was not a coordinate political
department at the crucial federal level, and judicial standards were
available to decide the issue.4
Frankfurter and Harlan strongly dissented from the Baker
decision. 3 Frankfurter read the plaintiff's claim as a covert use of the
Guaranty Clause,44 which the Court had long held to be nonjusticiable. 5
Further, and more important for purposes of this discussion, he insisted
11369 U.S. at 209-10.
"'Id. at 211.
"Id. at 217.
"This was in fact not a procedural argument but a substantive one. Brennan, Black, Warren
and Douglas eventually came to insist that extra-mathematical factors, such as a balance between
geographical regions within a state, were impermissible if they led to a debasement of comparative
voting strength. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
"Frankfurter echoed many of the arguments he had advanced in an earlier redistricting case,
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), which had been controlling until Baker.
""The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government ...." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
"The original case on the Guaranty Clause was Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) I (1849).
While agreeing with Frankfurter that Guaranty cases were nonjusticiable, the Baker majority saw
the Guaranty Clause as defining the judiciary's relation to Congress, not its relation to the states,
369 U.S. at 210, and rejected Frankfurter's claim that any complaint which could be restated as a
Guaranty case was thereby barred from review. Id. at 227.
[Vol, 51
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the question was the sort of complex political decision in which the
courts had no business engaging."
The majority of the Court, however, was able, consistent with sepa-
ration of powers, not only to intervene in Baker v. Carr, but to sanction
a series of reapportionment cases at the state,47 county, 8 even munici-
pal49 levels-both in general and in primary elections-in which similar
claims of voting debasement were voiced.
Among these cases was Wesberry v. Sanders" in which the Court
affirmed both its strong commitment to protect voting rights and its
boldness in the face of difficult political situations. Appellants in
Wesberry were members of Georgia congressional districts who claimed
that malapportionment gave less populous districts far greater propor-
tional influence in Congress. The respondents countered that article I,
section 4 of the Constitution gave the states authority over such district-
ing, subject to Congressional legislation.5 1 In a decision which some
observers interpreted as a move beyond a separation-of-powers theory,
52
Justice Black saw support in Baker for the proposition that "nothing in
the language of that article gives support to a construction that would
immunize state congressional apportionment laws which debase a citi-
zen's right to vote from the power of the courts. . . a power recognized
at least since our decision in Marbury v. Madison."53
Recently, in a case decided under another provision of the Consti-
tution, the Supreme Court again displayed the same kind of judicial
assertiveness in a justiciability dispute. In Powell v. McCormack,54
black congressman Adam Clayton Powell -sought to be seated in the
" In Colegrove Frankfurter had written: "Nothing is clearer than that this controversy con-
cerns matters that bring courts into immediate and active relations with party contests .... It is
hostile to a democratic system to involve the judiciary in the politics of the people." 328 U.S. at
553-54.
4 E.g., Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S.
678 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964).
4"E.g., Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968); Simon v. Lafayette Parish Police Jury,
226 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. La. 1964); Bianchi v. Griffing, 217 F. Supp. 166 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).
"Ellis v. Mayor & City Council, 352 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1965).
-376 U.S. 1 (1964).
"'The Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representa-
tives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may
at any time by Law make or altar such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing
Senators.
"Kauper, Some Comments on the Reapportionment Cases, 63 MicH. L. RI.V. 243, 244 (1964);
Tollett, supra note 4, at 459.
"1376 U.S. at 6.
"1395 U.S. 486 (1969).
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House of Representatives after being excluded by a decision of House
members angry over Powell's misuse of funds. Powell's opponents
claimed that article I, section 5 of the Constitution5 gave Congress the
power to judge its membership and made the issue of seating him non-
justiciable. The Court responded that it alone possessed supreme au-
thority to interpret the Constitution, even those sections that involved
"textually demonstrable constitutional commitments" to other
branches." The Court also directly confronted the argument that deci-
sion of the case had involved a "potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments" or expressed a
"lack of the respect due coordinate branches" within Baker's definition
of justiciability. With ironic modesty, Chief Justice Warren wrote that
reaching the merits "would require no more than an interpretation of
the Constitution ....
It should be clear from Baker, Wesberry, and Powell that the Court
has not seen the political question doctrine as a warning to tread gin-
gerly when political passions are aroused and partisan voices are raised.
The doctrine appears more theoretical than prudential; it is grounded
in the Court's interpretation of its proper function as limited by inherent
judicial capacity and by constitutional delegation of responsibilities to
other branches at the federal level.
THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE AND THE POLITICAL PARTIES
Having established the doctrinal framework, we must now examine
its specific application to political parties to determine if the courts have
found any general grounds to exempt party affairs from review. As the
majority in O'Brien intimated, Smith v. Allwright and Terry v. Adams
strongly suggest that the Supreme Court has not regarded all political
party affairs as nonjusticiable where they affect constitutionally pro-
tected activity.58 The Smith court insisted that blacks be allowed a vote
in the state Democratic Party primary, even though the Party Conven-
tion had voted to exclude them. 9 In Terry, the Court saw through an
-"Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own
Members .... Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for
disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member."
56395 U.S. at 521, quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
57395 U.S. at 548. "Such a determination falls within the traditional role accorded courts to
interpret the law, and does not involve a 'lack of the respect due [a] coordinate [branch] of
government'. . . .The alleged conflict that such an adjudication may cause cannot justify the
courts' avoiding their constitutional responsibility." Id. at 548-49.
5892 S. Ct. at 2720 n..
11321 U.S. at 656-63.
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insidious twist on this "white primary" arrangement. Hoping to escape
judicial scrutiny, a private "Jaybirds Association" had been formed
which held its own primary prior to the officially sanctioned Democratic
primary. The Jaybird winners almost without exception ran for Demo-
cratic office and were perennially successful. In finding that this ostensi-
bly private political activity was subject to judicial review, the Court
proclaimed its unwillingness to be mocked by subterfuge.'"
The O'Brien reference to Smith and Terry seems to imply, how-
ever, that only where race is involved will the Court overcome a tradi-
tional reluctance to disturb political parties. This note will examine the
four cases the O'Brien majority cited for its theory of judicial noninter-
ference, attempting to show that even they refute the Court's inference.
One of those cases, Lynch v. Torquato,1 involved a complaint by
residents of a Pennsylvania county that their Democratic County Chair-
man was chosen under state law by precinct leaders representing pre-
cincts of widely varying population. The appellants argued that under
Gray v. Sanders62 such a "unit system" denied them equal protection
of the laws. Additionally, they argued that the Democratic Chairman's
right personally to select a stand-in whenever a candidate in a Demo-
cratic primary withdrew also denied them equal protection. The circuit
court dismissed the appeal and distinguished between the right to select
general governmental representatives and the right to select other kinds
of representatives. The court, however, reserved judgment on the alleged
undemocratic process by which the Chairman appointed a stand-in can-
didate. 3 In fact, although the court refused to intervene in the election
of the party's internal manager, it confessed that it might enjoin the
selection of a stand-in by the unrepresentative Chairman if the question
arose in concrete form."
In Ray v. Blair,65 the Supreme Court refused to grant mandamus
to force certification by the Alabama Democratic Executive Chairman
of a candidate for presidential elector who refused to sign a loyalty oath
to the Democratic Party. Again, the Court's reason for the denial was
not that it eschewed all party primary disputes but that such disputes
were immaterial unless they violated some constitutional or statutory
C345 U.S. at 469-70.
61343 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1965).
62372 U.S. 368 (1963).
11343 F.2d at 372.
"Id. at 372-73.
-343 U.S. 214 (1952).
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provision.6
The other two cases on which the O'Brien majority relied both
involved claims that procedures used in the selection of delegates to
state party conventions violated strict one-man, one-vote standards. In
Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party,7 the court seemed to grasp
at a myriad of reasons for deciding against the appellant. It mentioned
judicial reluctance to enter intra-party disputes. It declared the issue
nonjusticiable, both because of a lack of judicially manageable stan-
dards-offering no explanation why the Supreme Court's insistent pro-
gression of decisions from Baker to Gray were inapposite-and "per-
haps" because of a lack of respect due coordinate branches of govern-
ment. 8 Not content to rest on these grounds, however, the court, admit-
ting that the judiciary had properly intervened in party affairs for racial
and constitutional principles, held that there was nothing of constitu-
tional significance in the alleged malapportionment of the Democratic
state convention. 9
Smith v. State Executive Committee70 involved a claim that the
Democratic Party's method of selection of delegates to the Georgia
state convention violated equal protection. The court found that since
party officials had invoked their discretion to permit open attendance
at the last convention, the rules as applied were not actionable. It thus
avoided the decision whether it would have intervened had an actual
violation occurred. Nevertheless, the court urged the party to find better
procedures, quoting Lynch's speculation that despite hesitation about
meddling in party affairs, a violation of constitutionally protected rights
might require it.
71
These last two cases, which have received serious criticism in more
recent court decisions, 72 were essentially rearguard actions to protect
state party conventions from the logic of Baker and Gray.73 Neverthe-
"Id. at 227.
67399 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1968).
6 Id. at 121.
6"d. at 120.
70288 F. Supp. 371 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
7"Id. at 376.
72Georgia v. National Democratic Party, 477 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
92 S. Ct. 109 (1971); Maxey v. State Democratic Committee, 319 F. Supp. 673 (W.D. Wash. 1970);
see Bode v. National Democratic Party, 452 F.2d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cerl. denied, 92 S. Ct.
684 (1972).
7 The courts worked to find reasons why equal protection principles, although they applied
to presidential party primaries, did not apply to delegate selection which occurred at party conven-
tions. The history of Supreme Court decisions involving voting rights, as we have seen, argues that
such loopholes should not be tolerated. See cases cited notes 6, 47 supra.
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less, each was careful to admit that in circumstances other than those
they adjudicated, intervention would be permissible, even mandatory.
CONCLUSION
The O'Brien majority correctly noted general judicial reluctance to
become involved in political party disputes. However, even those cases
they cited for this proposition indicate intervention is proper when party
practices violate the Constitution. This determination is not surprising;
indeed, the theoretical foundations of the political question doctrine
seem to forbid any other conclusion. Political parties, however influen-
tial in national affairs, are not a coordinate branch of government enti-
tled to deference because of separation of powers. Furthermore, if party
voting arrangements are justiciable when they violate one provision of
the Constitution (as in Smith and Terry), it is difficult to conceive why
they may be held nonjusticiable when they allegedly contravene another.
Such considerations combine to make the Court's "grave doubts"
puzzling. One explanation for the doubts is that the Court plans to
abandon the separation-of-powers interpretation for a prudential
theory. If the Court's remarks in O'Brien portend an imminent about-
face of such major proportions, it is understandable that they have
preferred to await a more propitious opportunity to expound their
change.
A second possible conclusion is that the Court would distinguish
between state parties and national parties for purposes of the justiciabil-
ity doctrine. Yet the considerations which Baker cited as determinative
of justiciability 74 seem irrelevant to any distinction between state and
national parties. More important, at least since United States v.
Classic,75 the Court has recognized that an election is a fabric of a single
piece; there is no rational point at which the courts should cease their
vigilant protection of the right of suffrage.
A better conclusion, one to which the Court several times made
allusion, is that the intricate relations between the various Democratic
"players"-the McGovern Commission, the National Committee, the
Credentials Committee-and the pressure of time prevented the Court
p369 U.S. at 217; see note 41 and accompanying text supra.
73313 U.S. 299, 318 (1941): "Where the state law has made the primary an integral part of
the procedure of choice . . . the right of the elector to have his ballot counted at the primary is
likewise included in the right protected by Article I, § 2. And this right of participation is protected
just as is the right to vote at the election .... "
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from reaching a rapid decision on the merits. 6 Only an explanation
grounded in momentary reticence rather than absolute refusal is conso-
nant with the nature of the doctrine and the history of its application.
Constitutional Law-First Amendment-The Balancing Process for Free
Exercise Needs a New Scale
Personal freedoms have been affected substantially by the-steadily
increasing scope of governmental regulation.' In Wisconsin v. Yoder,2
the Supreme Court granted the Amish people an exemption from the
compulsory education laws of the state, basing its decision on first
amendment free exercise of religion grounds. The potential tension be-
tween the free exercise of religion and extensive regulation is exacer-
bated in Yoder by a contemporary emphasis on education, by the inter-
ests of minors whose educational and religious futures are directly af-
fected by the Court's ruling, by the question of survival of a devout
separatist sect, and by the political reality that numerous exemptions
will make a regulatory scheme unworkable.
Three sets of Amish parents in Wisconsin 3 believing it sinful to
expose their children to the worldliness of the county consolidated high
school, held their children out of public school in violation of the Wis-
consin compulsory education law, which requires attendance to the age
of sixteen.' They were prosecuted, found guilty, and were fined five
dollars each. 5 The convictions were affirmed by the state circuit court,
6The Court recently granted certiorari and vacated judgment, remanding to the court of
appeals with instructions to dismiss as moot. 41 U.S.L.W. 3182 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1972).
'A good example of this tension is a requirement that all children in a school salute the
American flag and pledge allegiance. Such an exercise is forbidden to Jehovah's Witnesses by a
literal reading of the Ten Commandments. In Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943),
the Supreme Court held this requirement an unconstitutional infringement of free exercise.
292 S. Ct. 1526 (1972).
'Respondents in the case were Jonas Yoder, Ardin Yutzy, members of the Old Order Amish
Religion, and Wallace Miller, a member of the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church. Their
children, Frieda Yoder, aged fifteen, Barbara Miller, aged fifteen and Vernon Yutzy, aged four-
teen, were all graduates of the eighth grade of public school. Id. at 1529 n. 1.
'Wis. STAT. ANN. § 118.15 (1972). The pertinent provisions of the statute are:
(1) (a) Unless the child has a legal excuse or has graduated from high school, any
person having under his control a child who is between the ages of 7 and 16 years shall
cause such child to attend school regularly during the full period and hours, religious
holidays excepted, that the public or private school in which such child should be enrolled
is in session until the end of the school term, quarter or semester of the school year in
which he becomes 16 years of age.
192 S. Ct. at 1529-30.
[Vol. 51
